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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CONTINENTAL BANK & TRUST,
a corporation,

)
)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
)
vs.
)
)
UTAH SECURITY MORTGAGE, INC.,
)
a corporation, F. A. BADGER,
)
ADRIENNE BADGER, JOHN N. BUSK, )
PATRICIA C. BUSK, H. MERVIN
)
WALLACE, VIRGINIA S. WALLACE,
)
ROBERT M. WALLACE AND CAROLYN )
M. WALLACE,
)
)
Defendants-Appellants.)

Supreme Court No. 19086

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
NATURE OF CASE

This case involves the determination of the rights and
liabilities of six guarantors under a loan agreement, who guaranteed the payment of certain loans secured by trust deeds and
notes.

DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT

On February 22, 1983, Honorable Phillip R. Fishler of
the Third District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
founc for plaintiff-respondent Continental Bank & Trust Company,
and against defendant-appellants John M.
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Patricia C. Busk,

H Mervin Wallace, Virginia S.

Rohert

Wallace ani

Carolyn M. Wallace, jointly and severallv in the amount of
$101,605.76 plus interest and attorneys'

fees.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Appell3nts seek a reversal of the lower court's fai:
to discharge and release appellants in their capacity as ace:·
dation makers, guarantors and/or sureties from all liability the loan agreement; of the lower court's failure to find tha·
respondent Continental Bank

&

Trust unjustifiably impaired i:,

security in that it did not protect its security interest in
trust deeds and notes by proper recordation thereof as requb
by the loan agreements and corporate authorization, and beca":it did not protect its security interest in certain stock of
Bonneville Thrift & Loan in that it refused or neglected to
follow through with a sale of the stock to an existing, will
ready and able buyer; of the lower court's failure to find
respondent Continental

waived any language i'1 the guaran'.

agreement giving it rights to go against the guarantors,

by

having taken possession of the secondary collateral
foreclosure suit but failing to follow through 1-1ith s11ch sale
and with the lower court's finding that .'>;:i:::iellonts ·.1ai\•e.1
subrogation rights by signing the Guarantee.

-:!-

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On June 28, 1977, Appellants H. Mervin Wallace, Robert
M. Wallace and co-defendant F. A. Badger, in their capacity as

directors of the board of directors of Utah Security Mortgage,
Inc, a Utah corporation (hereinafter "Utah Security"), passed a
corporate resolution authorizing Utah Security to obtain loans
from Respondent Continental Bank, hereinafter "Continental" (Ex
71A).

The resolution stated that the loans would be secured by

trust deeds and notes (warehousing arrangement) on mortgages
which F.N.M.A. had committed to purchase on the secondary market.
Based upon this corporate authority and upon the express direction of Continental's loan committee to have the loans secured,
Continental did make loans to Utah Security from time to time.
Thus, Appellants both orally and in writing communicated to
Continental that they would only borrow the money if it was
secured.
Pursuant to the corporate resolution, F. A. Badger
executed three promissory notes from Utah Security to Continental
for the loans.

Two of these notes stated on their face they were

secured by trust deeds and assignments thereof (Ex. 76-79).

Utah

Security also assigned its trust deed and notes to Continental,
as agreed (Ex. 75, 177-197).

All of these loans to Utah Security

secured by these trust

and notes which had been sold

to F.N.M.A. and/or Utah Housing.
Utah Security provided to Continental a specific form
for the trust deeds and notes which were sold to F.N.M.A.,
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whereby payment woulrl be made directly to F.N.M.l1. to Contic
tal.

Continental did not complete the form as provided by r1>

Security to receive payment directly from F.N.M.l\. nor di,1

1

any time ever record and perfect the security interest in tho
trust deed and notes that were assigned to them as security':
such loans.

As of the present time, all of the trust deeds

2

notes which were given as security to Continental on said
promissory notes have been paid for by F.N.M.A. or Utah Houfr
Al though each trust deed, note, and ass ign111en t there:
was capable of being recorded, and shou:J,_d have been to perfect
its secured position as required by the corporate resolution,
Continental did not record any of the trust deeds, notes or
assignments thereon.

Continental did not obtain the consent,

either orally or in writing, from the Appellants to dispose

o:

otherwise fail to take tl-ie proper steps to perfect the secufr
interest.

These notes are still due and payable as

dated August 20, 1979, originally in the amount of $143,450.0J
now due, $4,625.50; note dated September 13, 1979, originaly '·
the amount of $28,591.73, now due, $28,591.73; and note dated
October 25, 1979, originally in the amount of $29,450.00, no·;
due, $29,450.00, together with interest on all of the
Appellants executed guarantee agreements to further
guarantee the payment of said loans

(Ex. 174, 175, 176).

In

November 1979, in addition to he above mentioned trust deeds'.
notes, promissory notes, and guarantees as security to Cont
tal, continental, after discovering its unsecured status on
loans, required as additional security certain stock intere'
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Utah Security and F. A. Badger had in an entity known as
Bonneville Thrift & Loan (hereinafter "Bonneville").
After Continental obtain the Bonneville stock, Bonneville became an "impaired" thrift.

As an "impaired" company in

order to keep operating, there would be, by necessity, a need for
a infusion of additional equity capital.

Appellants procured a

buyer, Citizen's Bank Shares and/or an individual Bunker, who
offered to purchase the stock interest of Utah Security and F. A.
Badger in Bonneville for an amount sufficient to pay the obligation represented by the notes.

Appellents sent a demand letter

to Continental on May 29, 1980 for Continental to take the necessary steps to sell the Bonneville stock (Ex. 80) and although on
June 3, lg8o, Continental gave Utah Security and F. A. Badger
notice of its intent to exercise its right as a secured party to
sell (Ex. 82, 83), no sale was held.

Continental knew of the

impaired status of Bonneville and was aware of the necessity to
act raoidly to realize any return on the stock.

Subsequently,

Citizen's Bank Shares' offer to purchase the stock interest of
Bonneville was reduced substantially.

Eventually this offer was

totally withdrawn by Citizen's Bank Shares.

Bunker's offer to

purchase was also withdrawn after certain litigation in Davis
County was adverse to their proposal.

Consequently, the value of

the Bonneville stock held as security after August, 1980, because
due to the inactivity of Continental.
Appellants did not consent to any impairment of the
Bonneville stock which was held by Continental for security for
their obligations, but rather specifically requested Continental
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to take steps to perfect their interest.

On February 22, l"

the Third District Court for Salt Lake County, State of
that Appellants-Guarantors fully consented to a waiver of t·.
impairment of collateral defense under Utah Code Annotated
§70A-3-606 and held them all liable to ContinenL1l L1nder
terms of the absolute guarantee of payment, and granted
nental's motion for summary judgment.

ARGUMENT
POINT I

RESPONDENT CONTINENTAL BANK BREACHED ITS DUTY TO PE?:
ITS SECURITY INTEREST IN THE LOAN COLLATERAL AND TW'o
UNJUSTIFIABLY IMPAIRED THE SECURITY, RELEASING APPL
LANTS FROM ALL LIABILIT'IES AS ACCOMMODATION MAKERS,
GUARANTORS AND/OR SURETIES.
The Appellants are accommodation makers, guarantors
and/or sureties as defined in Section 70A-3-606 of the Utah C:
Annotated, as amended, which section covers commercial paper'
provides in part as follows:
The holder cischarges any party to the instrument
to the extent that without such party's consent
the holder • • • .
(b)
Unjustifiably impairs anv collateral for
the instrument given by or on behalf of the part;
or any person against whom he has a right of
recourse.
The courts have uniformly held that
mean, among other things,

11

that if ContinPntal,

irnpairmf?nt

11

in this inst 0 :

fails to per feet the security interest and da'.Tiaqe results,
the same is an "i'.Tipairment" to the excent of any damage.
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car

t·

In the leading treatise entitled Uniform Commercial Code
2d, \'lhite and Summers, at page 525, it says:
Under Section 3-606 (1) (b) the surety is also discharged when without his consent, the creditor
"unjustifiably impairs any collateral for the
Often the creditor on a guaranteed
obl1gat1on will have two kinds of back up for the
debtors promise, the surety's promise and a security interest in the debtor's collateral. If the
creditor handles the collateral carelessly so that
its value is diminished or acts in a way which
makes the collateral unavailable to the-surety
(for example, fails to perfect his security
interest) then the surety may claim discharge
under 3-606 (1) (b).
This same position has been followed by all jurisdictions which have been called upon to rule on this particular
aspect of impairment.

First Bank & Trust Company v. Post, 10

Ill. App. 3d 127, 293 N.E.2d 907, 12 U.C.C.R.S. 512 (1973) was a
case directly on point.

In that instance, the defendant corpo-

rate officers, in order to enable the corporation to purchase
equipment, negotiated a loan with plaintiff bank, signed a
chattel mortgage note as guarantors, and the corporation was
subsequently placed in bankruptcy.
receiver in bankruptcy.

The equipment was sold by the

The bank had failed to properly file a

financing statement and thus perfect its security interest in the
collateral.

The court held that this constituted an unjustifiable

im::iairment of the collateral under U.C.C. §3-606 (1) (b).

The court

said that by not filing a financing statement in accordance with
U.C.C. Article 9, the bank held an unperfected security interest,
which became subordinate to that of the trustee in bankruptcy of
the corporation.

That subordinate position produced unjusti-

fiable impairment of the collateral in that the bank was prevented

.......
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_, __ _

to take steps to perfect their interest.

On February 22, 19 ,

the Third District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Ut;i
that Appellants-Guarantors fully consented to a waiver of t'.c
impairment of collateral defense under Utah Code Annotated
§70A-3-606 and held them all liable to Continental under
terms of the absolute guarantee of payment, and granted Cont:
nental's motion for summary judgment.

ARGUMENT
POINT I

RESPONDENT CONTINENTAL BANK BREACHED ITS DUTY TO PE
ITS SECURITY INTEREST IN THE LOAN COLLATERAL AND THI:
UNJUSTIFIABLY IMPAIRED THE SECURITY, RELEASING APPL
LANTS FROM ALL LIABILITIES AS ACCOMMODATION MAKERS,
GUARANTORS AND/OR SURETIES.
The Appellants are accommodation makers, guarantors
and/or sureties as defined in Section 70A-3-606 of the Utah :
Annotated, as amended, which section covers commercial paper:
provides in part as follows:
The holder oischarges any party to the instrument
to the extent that without such party's consent
the holder . • • •
(b)
Unjustifiably impairs any collateral for
the instrument given by or on behalf of the partv
or any person against whom he has a right of
recourse.
The courts have uniformly held that
mean, among other things, that if Continental,

in this instc

fails to perfect the security interest and damage results,
the same is an "impairment" to the extent of any damage.
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In the leading treatise entitled Uniform Commercial Code
\'Jhite and Summers, at page 525, it says:
Under Section 3-606 (1) (b) the surety is also discharged when without his consent, the creditor
"unjustifiably impairs any collateral for the
Often the creditor on a guaranteed
obl1gat1on will have two kinds of back up for the
debtors promise, the surety's promise and a secuinterest in the debtor's collateral. If the
creditor handles the collateral carelessly so that
its value is diminished or acts in a way which
makes the collateral unavailable to the-surety
(for example, fails to perfect his security
interest) then the surety may claim discharge
under 3-606(l)(b).
This same position has been followed by all jurisdictions which have been called upon to rule on this particular
aspect of impairment.

First Bank & Trust Company v. Post, 10

Ill. App. 3d 127, 293 N.E.2d 907, 12 U.C.C.R.S. 512 (1973) was a
case directly on point.

In that instance, the defendant corpo-

rate officers, in order to enable the corporation to purchase
equipment, negotiated a loan with plaintiff bank, signed a
chattel mortgage note as guarantors, and the corporation was
subsequently placed in bankruptcy.
receiver in bankruptcy.

The equipment was sold by the

The bank had failed to properly file a

financing statement and thus perfect its security interest in the
collateral.

The court held that this constituted an unjustifiable

impairment of the collateral under

u.c.c.

§3-606 (1) (b).

The court

sAid that by not filing a financing statement in accordance with
u.c.c. Article 9, the bank held an unperfected security interest,
which became subordinate to that of the trustee in bankruptcy of
the corporation.

That subordinate position produced unjusti-

fiable impairment of the collateral in that the bank was prevented
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from disposing of the collateral and crediting t'ie amount rer
to the indebtedness owed to it by the corporation.
In Schaffer v. Davir'lson,

445 P.2d 13, 5 U.C.C.R.S.

(Wyo. 1968), the principal debtor gave the creditor a chatte.
mortgage on his automobile but then sold the r:ar and disappec
When the creditor sued, the accommodation maker 3rgued that t
creditor's failure to perfect the security interest impaired
collateral and discharged her.

The trial court set off the·

of the automobile against the face amount of the note,
interest and attorneys'

fees.

On

the creditor argu&

that "impairment of collateral" in 3-606 (1) (b)

refers onl? tc

disminishment of the value of the physical property subject

t.

the security interest and not to impairment of the security
itself.

But the Wyoming Supreme court rejected his argument

held that the accommodation maker was discharged by the payee
failure to perfect.

In accord with this view see Security

National Bank v. Temarantz,

6 U.C.C. 157, N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1969,

White v. Household Finance Companv, 158 Ind. App. 394, 302 n.:
828, 13

u.c.c.

858

(1973).

Thus, where a statute requires filing in order to
perfect a security interest in collateral, and the loan that
secured by the collateral has l:leen guarar.teeo,
party fails to file,

if the secure·

the law implies a duty on the part

secured party to make such filing and the guarantor is entit
to be discharged and releaseo from his liability on the loan
the extent of the loss sustained by virtue of the securec1 P'
failure to file.

In support of t'iis view, also see

-8-

of Commerce v. Covolo, 540 P.2d 1294, N.Mexico (1975); Behlen
Mfg. Companv v. First National Bank of Englewood, 472 P.2d 703,

(Col. App. 1970); St. Paul Fire & M. Ins. Comoanv v. New Jersev

Bank & Trust Company, 250 A.2d 57 (N.Jersey 1969); and D.

w.

Jaguavs & Companv v. First Securitv Bank, 419 P.2d 85 (Ariz.
1966) •

In this instance, F.N.M.A. has succeeded to the interest
that Continental was assigned by way of security from Utah
Security and is now of record in each and every instance.

Mr.

Livingston of Continental specifically asserted the following in
his deposition on May 5, 1982 at page 25 and 26:
(By Mr. Brown) I take it that the bank had
the
. at least the option to perfect the security by recording the assignment of the trust
deed; isn't that correct?

Q.

A.

Yes.

Q. During your period of handling the account,
did you ever record any assignments of the trust
deed?

A.

No, we did not.

Q. You didn't ever perfect any of the secured
positions, then?

A.

No.

Q. That was the decision, I take it, then, by the
bank or by you not to perfect the security
interest?

A.

That would be correct.

The terms and conditions of the loans to be made were
3trictly on a secured basis.

Mr. Willard S. Jensen, Senior Vice

President of Continental , testified in his deposition of February
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5, 1982, that the corporat"' resolution dated 28 June 1977 cortained two sheets and that they were stapled together and ththe second sheet of that corporate resolution specifically
provides:
At a meeting held June 28, 1977, the Board of
Directors resolved to allow F. Allonzo Badger to
negotiate a loan with Continental Bank.
This loan
is to be secured by trust deed notes on mortgages
that F.N.M.A. have committed to purchase.
Further, in all of the documentation of the loan committee of
all the loans that were ta ken by Utah Secur it v required that

t

loans be secured by assignments of notes and trust deeds on re_
estate.
In Langevald v. L. R.
1931, 22 U.C.C.R.S. 106

z.

H. Corp., 74 N.J. 45, 376 A.

(N.Jersey 1977)

with a very similar situation.

the court there dealt

The court held that the fail11r-

of a note holder to record a mortgage securing an indebtedneso
which defendants had guaranteed constituted an unjustifiable
impairment of the collateral under U.C.C.

3-606(1) (b).

The

plaintiff creditor failed to record the mortgage for about a
year, during which time several other liens of substantial
amounts were recorded.
In the recent case of Mack Financial Corooration v.
Scott, 606 P.2d 993,

(Idaho 1980), the court discussed at grf:'

length the term "unconditional guarantee" and asserted that:
term "unconditional guarantee" has an established meaning wit
the realm of commercial law.

It went on to indicate that tlir·

are two types of guarantees, one being an absolute guarantee
the other being a conditional guarantee, the distinction

-10-

b2'.·

that an absolute guarantee, unlike a conditional one, casts no
duty upon the creditor or holder of the obligation to attempt
collection from the principal debtor before looking to the
guarantor.

In this instance, it appears that the guarantee

executed by these defendants is, in fact, an absolute guarantee.
The court then went on to determine whether a guarantor under an
absolute or unconditional guarantee could avail

of the

defenses under the U.C.C. and held as follows as page 998:
The question to be decided is whether an unconditional guarantor may avail himself of the defense
of the commercial unreasonableness of creditor's
disposition of collateral securing the obligation
in an action by the creditor against the guarantor.
The courts which have addressed the question have
held that where the actions of a creditor impair
the value of the collateral in its possession
which secures an obligation guaranteed by a
guarantor, either absolute or conditional, the
guarantor will be discharged to the extent of the
loss occasioned bv the creditor.
(Emphasis
supplied and citations omitted.)
The Idaho Court cited with approval the case of Zion's
First National Bank v. Hurst, 570 P.2d 1031 (Utah 1977).
In the case of Behlen Mfg., supra, the Colorado court
discussed at great length whether or not a guarantor on an unconditional guarantee could be released where the creditor had
failed to record an assignment and mortgage, which resulted in a
loss to the guarantor.

The court discussed at length the various

authorities and then cited with approval general law that is
reported in Am. Jur.2d under Suretyship, and then concluded at
706 as follows:
The above quoted section of Am. Jur. accurately
state the law as to suretyship and this law is
equally aoplicable to an unconditional guarantee.

-11-

The guarantor has a right of suhrogation to the
security upon the
of the obligation.
In a case cited by the Colorado court, the law is
further delineated as follows:
It is well settled that where one secondarily
liable is called on to make good on his obligation
and pay the debt, he steps into the shoes of the
former creditor. He becomes subrogated to all
rights of the credit against the principal debtor,
including the security given to secure the debt.
Allen v. See, 10th Cir. 196 F.2d 608.
In our instance, we no longer have any collateral tf,,
has value because of the failure of Continental to record it 0
interest in the trust deed and note in the appropriate county
recorder's office, or to take the necessary steps to effectuat
sale of the stock interest to Citizen's Bank Shares of Bonnev:
Thrift at a time in which the same had value.

Subsequently,

Citizen's Bank Shares offer was withdrawn in its entirety
Bonneville Thrift & Loan went through reorganization and the
stock is no longer of any value.
In 74 Am. Jur. 2d page 68, Section 93 under Suretyshic
it states in part:
The collateral security taken by a creditor may
require some act on the part of the creditor to
make it a valid security. Where such is the case,
the law implies an agreement on his part to perform the act.
If he neglects or fails to do so
and the security is thereby lost or impaired, the
surety may be dlscharged to the extent of his loss
or injury. Thus, where collateral security is
given in the form of a mortgage, deed of. trust,
similar instrument, and the statute requires it co
be filed or recorded in order to make it valid
against innocent purchasers, it is the duty of the
creditor to see that the instrument is prooerly
filed or recorded; and if he negligently fails to
act, the surety will
discharged to the extent

:r
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of the loss occasioned, or perhaps, completely
discharged.
POINT II
APPELLANT-GUARANTORS DID NOT WAIVE THEIR RIGHT TO
SUBROGATION BY SIGNING THE GUARANTY FORM PROVIDED BY
RESPONDENT BANK
The right of a guarantor-surety to subrogation can be
waived by a guarantor only by the most express and unequivocal
language.

The right does not originate in contract and cannot

likely be destroyed by contract.
America v. Demes, 446 F. Supp. 388

National Acceptance Company of
(N.D. Ill. E.D. 1977); Ameri-

can Bank of Commerce v. Corvolo, supra, at 1299; First National
Bank in Grand Forks v. Haugen Ford, Inc., 219 N.W.2d 847

(N.D.

1974). Behlen Mfg, supra, at 707, 708; and Jacquays, supra, at

89.
It is well settled that the rights of the guarantor as
2gainst the creditor are determined by the terms of the contract
of the parties.

38 Arn. Jur.2d, Guaranty, Section 126, Behlen

supra, at 705.

In Behlen, supra, the court recognized that

where there is more than one contract, i.e. a guaranty and a loan
agreement, the rights and obligations of the parties are to be
determined from all the documents and the law applicable thereto.
In Joe Heaston Tractor and Implement Company v. Securities
Acceotance Corporation, 248 F.2d 196, 200, the court held it was
npcessary to consider the contract as a whole, the purpose for
which it was given, together with all the surrounding circumstances existing at the time the guarantee was executed.
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This court in Zions v. Hurst,

determined tha'

loo!<ing at guaranty contract disputes, one should look to th,
"fundamentals of contract law;

i.e., the ascertaining of the

intent upon which there was a meeting of the minds" suora at
1033.

Also, in Union Pacific Railroad Companv v. El Paso Na:

Gas Companv, 408 P.2d 910, this court said that the law does·
look with favor upon one exacting a covenant to relieve hirnso:
of a basic duty which the law imposes on him and that when
interpreting the contract, the objective is to determine what
parties intended at the time it was executed, and that it be
clearly expressed and understood.
Of concern to the lower court in this instance wast·
fact that Appellant-Guarantors allegedly consented to a
release of right in the collateral by having signed
guaranty form.

It is Appellants' contention that the

waiver was not by the required express and unequivocal langua:
because as evidenced by the corporate resolution authorizing'.
loan, it was Appellants'

intent that the loan be made on the

condition that it be secured by trust deeds and notes thereor,
Appellants argue that any boilerplate language to the contrar
the guaranty was not their intent at the time they executed l
contract.

The loan committee required that for any loan to'

made to Utah Security, it was to be secured bv assignments
trust deeds and notes.
Continental and the lower courts both rely upon
Bank of Commerce v. Covolo,

as the controlling law.

that case a bank took a second lien upon the corporation's
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c:

license, as part of the security for $100,000.00 loan to the
who was entering the restaurant business, but the
failed to perfect the security interest in it.

The

$100,000.00 loan was guaranteed by the corporation's four

stockholders.

Thereafter, an additional $10,000.00 promissory

note was executed by the corporation, and also three personal
notes in the amount of $4,000.00 each.

In an action by the

guarantors of the loan the court agreed with the guarantors that
under U.C.C. §3-601(1) (b) the bank had a duty of timely perfecting the security interest in the liquor license.

But the

court reversed itself saying that the guarantors expressly waived
their right to subrogation and any benefit to participate in the
security.
However, some very key distinctions between Covolo and
the case at hand have been ignored.

First of all, in deciding

that the guarantors in Covolo expressly waived their right of
subrogation by signing the guaranty, the New Mexico court says,
"The Guarantors waive their rights to subrogation, the very right
they now claim was impaired, and waive and release any claims to
the security and 'any benefit of, and any right to participate in
any security now or hereafter held by Bank.'"

Covolo at 1298.

There is no such language in the guaranty between Utah Security
and Continental.

Nowhere in that guaranty do the
waive or release any claim to, or benefit of

the security, or to participate in the security.

This

distinction is crucial inasmuch as this waiver and release lan]uage found in the Covolo guaranty, and absent in Utah Security's
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guaranty, left the New Mexico Court no choice but to f" d
1n

the guarantors had waived their subrogration rights.

th•

Hencrc,

Covolo cannot be the standard for imposing the same determh,
on Appellant-Guarantors.

Our case parts company with

the following particulars:
a.

The waiver and release language found in tr,

Covolo guaranty does not exist in the Continental Security guaranty.
b.

The New Mexico court also said in Covolo, ":

was no loan agreement or contract of broader compass
touching the guarantor's obligations, other than the
continuing guarantees."

Covolo at 1298.

Covolo tur··

simply on reading and interpreting the provisions o'
guaranty agreement to determine whether the guaranto:
should be relieved of liability under the general la·.
suretyship.

In our case, however, we are not merely

left with the guaranty agreement to determine the
and obligations of the guarantors.

ri:

We also have a :·

agreement which can be considered and construed too,.
with the guarantees.

Such consideration is proper t·

determine the intent of the parties at the time thee
exercised the guaranty.

It was clearly their intent

that the loans were to be secured, and not that thi:
right be waived, as it was in Corvolo.
c.

Continenta:'s own loan committee required

loans to be secured.
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On page 35 of his deposition taken on February 5,
1982, Willard S. Jensen, executive vice-president of
Continental said:
Q.
(By Mr. Brown) Did you ever make, to your
knowledge, Utah Security Mortgage, Inc. a loan
that was not secured by an assignment of a trust
deed and a trust deed note and/or mortgage or
mortgage note?

A.

Not to my knowledge.
In its course of dealing with Utah Security, Conti-

nental never made a loan to Utah Security unless it was
secured.

Appellant-Guarantors had no reason to believe

any loan would ever be given to them without such
security.
d.

The New Mexico court in Covolo decided the

notes in that case were intended to be unsecured because
they were so specified on their faces.

But again, two

of the three promissory notes given by Utah Security to
Continental indicate on their faces that they are
secured by trust deeds or assignments of trust deeds
(Ex. 78, 79).

Continental admits, however, that even

the third note, although not shown on its face, was
secured (Ex. 5 of the Willard S. Jensen deposition).
From all of the foregoing, it is clear that the intent
nf the parties was that the loans be secured, and, that there was

any waiver by Appellant-Guarantors.
In addition, the New Mexico court, despite finding the
omissions to perfect its security interest were arguably
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negligent, found that the bank had acted in good faith, rlii·
gence, reasonableness anCI care in having the guarantors
the guarantees.

exec

The U.C.C. §1-201(9) defines "good faith"

"honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned."
Appellants maintain that Continental' s

in the tr

was not honesty in fact, in that Continental knew that Appe'._
would not, nor were they authorized to by the corporation, o:·
a loan unless it was secured.
Finally, in St. Paul Fire, supra, the New Jersey

SJ:-

Court took an even more protective stand toward guarantors.
There the plaintiff bank failed to file a notice of lendina :·
loans extended and secured by monies to be earned in the
struction project.

con-

Despite the fact that the guarantor had

signed a guaranty with the standard waiver language, the

coJ:

found that the guaranty language included no Provision
exonerating the bank from the legally implied consequences o:
failure to file.

The court also said at page 59:

In situations where the creditor alone can take
the action necessary for the preservation of
security, he will be required to do so. Where he
neglects to record a mortgage or transfer, or
gives no notice to the obligor on
in
action of its assignment, the security will be
discharged to the extent of his loss.
Furthermore, a contract of suretyship is, at
least in general, construed in favor of
surety.
This contract of quarantv is in the form of a
lengthy document in fine print, obviouslv
by the bank's attorne?s. Such an instrument, 'i<e
a policv of insurance, documents used in consumer
credit sales and other forms of agreement in common use, will be most strictlv construed against
the party which has prepared and off0r the
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particular instrument for execution
added).

(Emphasis

Appellants urge this court to recognize that this
particular case involves unique facts and issues, such which beg
for the application of the policy of protecting the surety's
rights of subrogation.

Such an application would be more than

warranted here, where the intent of these Appellants was to in no
wise consent to an exoneration of Continental from its duty to
protect its security by filing, that in fact Continental is not
relieved of this duty, even by their own guaranty form, which
should be strictly construed against them.
very clear their

These Appellants made

intent to Continental, both orally and in

writing, and Continental should thus not be permitted to circumvent and over

reach this intent by the subsequent execution of

the guaranties.

POINT III
RESPONDENT CONTINENTAL BANK ACTED COMMERCIALLY
UNREASONABLE AND THUS WAIVED ANY RIGHT THEY HAD UNDER
THE GUARANTY TO LOOK TO APPELLANTS IN THEIR CAPACITY AS
ACCOMMODATION MAKERS, GUARANTORS AND/OR SURETIES FOR THE
SATISFACTION OF THEIR CLAIM BY HAVING TAKEN POSSESSION
OF THE SECONDARY COLLATERAL, AND THE COMMENCING, BUT NOT
COMPLETING FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS.
Section 70A-9-207 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as
amended, requires a secured party to act in a commercially
manner with regard to the debtors collateral.

In

F.M.A. Financial Corporation v. Pro Printers, 590 P.2d 803

this court determined that when a creditor who respossesses
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(1979)

security does not give notice of the sale or the sale is
cially unreasonable, the creditor can obtain no deficiency r,
the guarantor.

Also see Zions v. Hurst, supra, which is i,.

accordance with this law.
Francis, 646 P.2d 741

In Strevell-Paterson Companv, Ir.·

(1982)

this court upheld the foregoins

requirement of Pro Printers,

but also stood for the pi

sition that a creditor does not have to exhaust the securit<I
before a guarantor could be held liable, when the
not repossessed.
Appellants agree that they can be held liable for
debt in their capacity as guarantors without Continental havi,.
to first exhaust the security.

However, Appellants argue tha'.

once the security was in the possession of Continental, Stre'''Paterson was no longer controlling.

As was the situation inf

Printers, similarly Continental had in their possession the
secondary collateral, the Bonneville stock.

Continental had

given notice of their election to exhaust the security at a
sale.

Having made that election and taken only the first of

two required steps, Continental waived any right it might
previously had to hold Aopellant-Guarantors liable.

Appellan:·

Guarantors asked the court to consider applying the law of
election of remedies in this situation.

Once a party has ma'

affirmative act of election of remedies, he is bound.
adopted this view.

Utah

When two or more co-existing remedies,

cJr

which the party has a right to elect, exist, and the alterna'
remedies are inconsistent, and the party chooses one !:iy brir·
an action based on one of the inconsistent remedies, the ele
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1

s final, and failure to secure satisfaction by means of the

:cmedy which he has adopted furnishes no legal reason to permit
him to resort to the other.

Utah Idaho C.R. Company v. Indus-

trial Commission, 86 Utah 363, 35 P.2d 842; Farmers and Merchants
Bank v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corooration, 4 Utah 2d 155, 298
P.2d 1045; and Cook v. Covey-Ballard Motor Company, 69 Utah 161,

'.'53 P. 196.
An election between two inconsistent remedies is final,
conclusive, and irrevocable, and constitutes an absolute bar to
any action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent with that asserted
by the election.
bar.

It is the first act of election that acts as a

Section 32 Election of Remedies, 25 Am. Jur. at 674, 675;

and Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission, 81 Utah 213, 17 P.2d
239.
Section 70A-l-102(3) of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as
amended, states that an unconditional guaranty agreement cannot
waive the obligation of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and
care.

That provision also says that "parties may by agreement

determine the standards by which the performance of such obligation is to be measured if such standards are not manifestly
unreasonable."
Respondent bank has asserted that the language of the
guaranty provides some standard of performance of the surety
ohligation, which language does not impose on Continental a duty
to sell the Bonneville stock.

While this standard may be quite

reasonable giver. total inaction on the part of Continental,
'.cpellants vigorously contend that the absence of such a duty is
-21-

wholly unreasonable when the creditor, Continental,
embarks using one form of action, but then midway through

t'

course of action, either intentionally or neoli:;ently, Lii>
follow through, but rather attempts to backtrack anf pursue
another cause of action.

When Continental gave notice of iL

intention to exhaust and sell the security, then only to cha
its mind by failure to consummate a sale and deciding to

go

against Appellant-Guarantors, such action was a viol3tion

0•

faith, diligence, reasonableness and care, which care was

n0t,

and cannot be, waived bv Appellants.
Appellants pray for a decision preventing a credito'.
such as Continental, from arbitrarily waivering between one
remedy and another, and yet being ahle to perserve its rights
against the guarantor under the blanket protection of good f2:·
diligence, reasonableness and care.

CONCLUSION

It is respectfully submitted that the lower court er:
in not releasing or discharging the Appellant-Guarantors
their liability on the loan agreement, inasmuch as Continenta
impaired its security by failing to perfect such interest an·
ignoring the intent and request of

that

secured, and because no language in the

waived

Appellant-Guarantors' right to subrogation nor exonerated
Continental of the duty to perfect its interest,

r 0 ntinental was unreasonable and in bad faith when it proceeded
to take steps to exhaust the security interest, but then failing
to follow through with the same.
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